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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Amanda Skogen demonstrated that the sentence imposed by the district court in 
her case was improper on a multitude of grounds, including that it was improperly based 
solely on the flawed concept of general deterrence, that it did not even serve that flawed 
objective, that it was based on an insufficient consideration of various mitigating factors, 
and that it improperly created a new mandatory sentence for caregivers and babysitters. 
Based on these many abuses of discretion, Ms. Skogen respectfully requested relief 
from this Court. 
The State responded with several arguments which Ms. Skogen believes 
necessitate a reply, particularly because the State glosses over the crux of her 
argument and focuses on solely procedural grounds in an attempt to distract this Court 
from the real issue in this case: the abuse of discretion arising from courts relying on 
flawed justifications within the greater sentencing scheme in order to impose excessive 
sentences. 
Specifically, the grounds to challenge the use of general deterrence alone to 
justify an excessive sentence were preserved and are wlthin the purview of this Court's 
jurisdiction and Ms. Skogen did not invite the error by simply acknowledging that 
deterrence and punishment are recognized sentencing objectives. This is because she 
contended that her overall sentence should have been more lenient under the broader 
sentendng scheme, which the State appears to misunderstand. And under that 
current sentencing scheme, Ms. Skogen's argument - that relying on only general 
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deterrence to justify the punishment of imprisonment - was preserved and the failure to 
adhere to the sentencing scheme constitutes an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
Additionally, the State did not refute the merits of Ms. Skogen's argument in 
regard to the continued viability of general deterrence as a sentencing objective, nor did 
it present a justified reason for this Court to not address them. Furthermore, even if 
general deterrence is still acceptable to this Court, Ms. Skogen's sentence does not 
serve that objective, and her analysis of that objective (and the need for certainty 
therein). does not deprive the district courts of discretion at sentencing. Finally, a 
sufficrent consideration of the various mitigating factors, without considering 
inappropriate factors in aggravation, reveals that the sentence is, in fact, excessive and 
thus constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate Ms. Skogen's sentence and remand her case 
for appropriate sentencing, or alternatively, reduce her sentence as this Court deems 
appropriate. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Skogen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Whether Ms. Skogen's challenges to the use of general deterrence, both as a 
part of the sentencing scheme and as applied in her case specifically, are 
property before this Court, and a proper analysis of that obJective should result in 
a more lenient sentence. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence on Ms. Skogen. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ms. Skogen's Challenges To The Use Of General Deterrence, Both As A Part Of The 
Sentencing Scheme And As Appried In Her Case S_p~mq~lly. Are Properly Before This 
Court. And A Proper Analysis Of That Obiective Should Result In A More Lenient 
Sentence 
A lntroductiQI'! 
Ms. Skogen has challenged the use of only general deterrence to justify her 
sentence as improper in two ways. First, she contended that relying solely on general 
deterrence within the greater sentencing scheme to justify a sentence of imprisonment 
constitutes an abuse of discretion, as the concept of general deterrence has been 
demonstrated to be flawed. Second, she challenged the district court's analysis and 
application of that objective in her case specifically. In that regard, Ms. Skogen argued 
that the district court's failure to consider other similar sentences deprives both her 
sentence and those other sentences of any general deterrent force they might have had 
because it deprives them of consistency. Both of these issues are properly before this 
Court, which should remedy the district court's abuses of discretion in these regards. 
B. By Failing To Address The Substantive Arguments Made In The Appellant's 
Brief. The State Conceded Those Issues 
The State, in its Respondent's brief, opted to only pursue procedural issues and 
to not address the merits of Ms. Skogen's substantive challenges to the district court's 
actions in this case. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-13 (contending that Ms. Skogen's 
arguments in this regard should be rejected only because they were not preserved, 
separation of powers would prevent this Court from holding in favor of Ms. Skogen, and 
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comparative sentencing is inappropriate under Idaho's sentencing scheme).) None of 
these arguments speak to the substantive argument Ms. Skogen made in her opening 
brief - that the concept of general deterrence itself, regardless of how or why it has 
been incorporated into the Idaho sentencing scheme, has been demonstrated to be an 
erroneous concept. (App. Br., pp.10-15.) Ms. Skogen pointed to problems with the 
logic and effect of the concept of general deterrence, all of which go unanswered by the 
State. Therefore, because it failed to provide argument or authority in regard to the 
merits of that challenge, it has waived any such challenge. See State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 263 (1996); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303 (2007); State v. Li, 131 Idaho 
126, 129 (Ct. App. 1998); I.A.R. 35(b)(6). 1 Thus, if Ms. Skogen demonstrates that there 
are no procedural bars to her arguments (of whrch there are none), the State cannot 
argue against the substantive merits of her case and this Court should grant her relief. 
1 While Zichko, the leading case on this issue, dealt with an appellant's failure to comply 
with the rules, the opinion is actually broader, holding: "A party waives an issue cited on 
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking." Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263 (emphasis 
added). This holding is in accordance with I .A. R. 35, which places similar burdens and 
requirements on both the appellant and the respondent when they prepare to file a brief. 
See I.AR. 35 (a)-(b). In addition to being harmonious with Idaho's appellate rules, it is 
also in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's determination that where a 
procedural rule benefits one party, a reciprocal protection must be given to the other 
party, else it causes fundamental unfairness in the proceedings in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 
471-72. Therefore, the State's failure to provide argument against the substantive 
contentions Ms. Skogen set forth in her Appellant's Brief results in its waiver of those 
issues. 
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C. The Use Of General Deterrence Alone To Justify A Sentence Is An Abuse Of 
Discretion Because Doing So Runs Contrary To The Sentencing Sche_me As A 
Whole 
Ms. Skogen demonstrated the reasons why relying on general deterrence 
alone in sentencing is invalid. (See App. Br., pp.10-19.) She presented this Court with 
arguments backed by scientific analysis which reveal that general deterrence, 
particularly where the sentencing courts are afforded such broad discretion as they are 
in Idaho, cannot have a cognizable impact on the public's actions. (App. Br., pp.10-14.) 
She also presented this Court with other arguments, again supported by scientific 
analysis, revealing that the concept of general deterrence cannot be applicable in 
voluntary manslaughter cases due to the nature of such actions to be "upon a sudden 
quarrel or the heat of passion." (App. Br., pp.14-15.) Finally, she presented yet other 
findings, still backed by scientific analysis, that in the absence of any need to provide 
specific deterrence and rehabilitation, lncarceration only serves to increase the risk that 
a person will pose to society upon release. (App. Br., pp.16-19.) 
The State's only response to these arguments, besides whether they are 
properly before this Court, was that since the Legislature included general deterrence 
as a factor for the courts to consider,2 this Court must disregard Ms. Skogen's 
arguments in terms of the viability of general deterrence as a sentencing factor.3 
2 The State also argued that comparative sentencing was inappropriate, and thus 
Ms. Skogen's arguments should be disregarded. (Resp. Br., pp.11-13.) That argument 
is more properly couched in terms of the specific analysis of the effect of general 
deterrence in Ms. Skogen's sentence, and so it will be discussed in Section l(D), infra. 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that the factors listed in I.C_ § 19-2521 are 
merely a set of guidelines for the district court. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 
(2005). In that statute, the Legislature listed certain factors that the Legislature 
suggested that the sentencing courts consider when imposing sentences. Id. As such, 
the statute does not mandate which factors the sentencing court must consider, but 
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( See Resp. Br., pp.10-13.) That position misunderstands the sentencing objectives as 
they have been established by both the Legislature and the Judiciary. General 
deterrence is but one of several factors it is suggested that the sentencing court 
consider when imposing a sentence designed to provide the greatest protection to 
society. Therefore, when the other objectives indicate that incarceration is not 
appropriate or necessary to provide protection to society, then general deterrence 
cannot be the sole factor which justifies such a sentence, especially because of the 
flaws with the concept itself. 
As a result, the district court's explicit reliance on general deterrence to justify the 
harsher punishment of imprisonment when it had already found the other factors 
demonstrated there was no need to protect society through imprisonment constitutes an 
abuse of its discretion. This Court should remedy that abuse. 
1. The Challenge To The Use Of General Deterrence Alone Was Preserved By 
Defense, Counsel's Arguments In Regard To The Sentencing Scheme As A 
Whole 
The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly established that the governing criteria, or 
sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). It has just as 
rather, leaves sentencing to the court's discretion. Id. at 932; State v. Vondenkamp, 
141 Idaho 878, 888 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 123, 128 (Ct. App. 
2005). Therefore, while LC. § 19-2521 does list general deterrence as a factor that 
sentencing courts may want to consider, they do not have to. Thus, if this Court finds 
that the concept of general deterrence is no longer valid, H: may instruct that the lower 
courts should not continue to consider it when they imposes sentences, and it may do 
so without infringing on the Legislature's authority. 
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clearly set forth that ''The primary consideration is . , . the good order and protection 
of society. All other factors are, and must be, subservient to that end." State 
v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993) (quoting State v. Moor, 78 Idaho 359, 363 
(1956) (emphasis added, ellipsis in original). This clearly instructs that where society 
does not demand protection from the defendant, none of the other three objectives 
(deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution) may trump it, become the primary objective, 
and force incarceration for their sake alone. See id. 
The Legislature placed a similar restriction on the three subservient objectives: 
uThe court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing 
sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that 
imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public because .... " I.C. § 19-2521 (1) 
(emphasis added). The Legislature goes on to list six factors which the sentencing 
court should consider as increasing the need to overcome this implied presumption 
against incarceration in order to protect the public. I.C. § 19-2521(1)(a)-(f). It also sets 
forth nine factors which the sentencing court should consider as weighing "in favor of 
avoiding a sentence of imprisonment."4 LC. § 19-2521 (2)(a)-(i). The construction of this 
statute, particularly through the language employed, clearly requires the sentencing 
court to hold the protection of society paramount. I.C. § 19-2521(1). It also clearly 
requires the district court to avoid imposing a sentence of imprisonment, only resorting 
4 The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that the factors listed in I.C. § 19-2521 merely 
list various guidelines that the Legislature suggested that the sentencing courts 
consider. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005). As such, the statute does not 
mandate which factors the sentencing court must consider, but rather, leaves 
sentencing to the court's discretion. Id. at 932. 
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to such an option if its consideration of the factors indicates that the only way to protect 
society is by incarcerating the defendant. See I.C. § 19-2521 . 
Under both the Legislature's construction and the Court's interpretation, the 
sentencing court must focus primarily on the protection of society. If society does not 
demand incarceration of the defendant in order to protect itself, none of the other 
secondary objectives alone may trump it. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500 (holding 
that all the other sentencing factors are subordinate to the protection of society). 
Defense counsel specifically requested that the district court "pronounce a sentence 
based on factors outlined that the Court has to apply. Those factors are announced in 
the State versus Toohill decision."5 (3/11/11 Tr., p.248, Ls.2-5.) In making this request, 
defense counsel preserved Ms. Skogen's challenge to the district court's subsequent 
misapplication of those factors. Ms. Skogen subsequently challenged the district court 
on those grounds. (See, e.g., R. , Vol.2, pp.487-88.) As such, the issue of whether the 
district court abused its discretion by basing its decision upon general deterrence alone 
when the district court had already indicated that society did not demand protection 
through incarceration from Ms. Skogen is properly before this Court. 
2. The Use Of General Deterrence Alone To Justify A Harsher Pvnishment 
Constitutes An Abuse Of Discretion 
Reliance on the flawed concept of general deterrence alone to justify a prison 
sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion because it does not adhere to the overall 
sentencing scheme established in case law and statute.6 Ms. Skogen presented all the 
5 State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565 (Ct. App. 1982). 
6 Ms. Skogen recognizes that punishment is also one of the objectives and is served by 
a sentence of incarceration . However, she would point out that any imposed sentence 
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evidence necessary to determine that the concept is flawed, especially in the context of 
voluntary manslaughter, and that imposing a sentence of imprisonment without the 
need for rehabilitation and specific deterrence increases the risk the inmate would pose 
to society upon release in her Appellant's Brief and need not reiterate it here, although 
constitutes "punishment." See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) 
(recognizing that probation is akin to imprisonment, in that it is a punishment imposed 
for the violation of the law and restricts the person's freedoms as a result of its 
imposition). Therefore, as "punishment" is addressed in every case where some 
sentence is imposed, that objective is omnipresent, and as such, whether it is 
considered alongside any of the other objectives is irrelevant. The result is that the 
district court imposed a sentence based only on general deterrence, as any sentence it 
imposed would serve the retributive objective. 
Furthermore, if Ms. Skogen is correct and general deterrence either was an 
inappropriate factor for consideration at sentencing or was not served by her sentence, 
the fact that her sentence still serves the objective of retribution is not enough to justify 
the sentence. The sentencing scheme does not permit the courts to impose overly-long 
prison sentences, even if one of the other objectives is potentially served in doing so. 
·See, e.g., Tapia v. United States., 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (2011) (while interpreting a 
statute, the Supreme Court determined that the statute precluded courts from increasing 
the length of a sentence, even in order to provide for additional rehabilitation, as 
Congress had found that incarceration did not promote rehabilitation). As such, relying 
on only retribution to justify an overly-long sentence is also improper. See, e.g., State 
v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 72 (Ct. App. 1998) (increasing the length of a sentence just to 
penalize the defendant, in that case for exercising his rights, is inappropriate). 
Regardless, even sentences for imprisonment based on punishment and deterrence are 
inappropriate in cases where society does not demand that protection through 
incarceration. Therefore, even if the State is correct and the sentence does serve the 
dual goals of general deterrence and retribution, relying on them to justify incarceration 
in absence of a need to protect society by that same sentence is inappropriate under 
the sentencing scheme. See, e.g., Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
The State cites to two cases which it claims support the premise that even 
retribution alone justifies a sentence for a term of imprisonment. (Resp. Br., p.13. (citing 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285 (2003); Staie v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 49 (2007).) 
The Sheahan Court indicated that the district court in that case also considered 
deterrence and protection of society. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 285. The Whittle 
Court also considered the fact that the defendant had been given the opportunity to 
serve a period of probation and in light of the new evidence arising from her commission 
of numerous felonies, upheld the sentence based on that new evidence. Whittle, 145 
Idaho at 52. The sentences for those crimes, it held, was properly in place to serve all 
four of the objectives, and was only excessive in length. Id. at 53. As such, neither 
case stands for the proposition the State claims they do. 
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she incorporates it herein by reference thereto. (App. Br., pp.10-19.) As the State 
opted not to present argument in contravention to those points, any such arguments are 
deemed waived. See, e.g., Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; I.AR. 35(a)-(b). 
The reason the reliance on this flawed factor cannot be the sole basis to impose 
a punishment of incarceration is based on the structure of the sentencing scheme 
established by the Legislature and the Judiciary. Both clearly establish that the primary 
goal is to protect society. I.C. § 19-2521 (1 ); Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. All the 
other factors listed are suggestions of issues the sentencing court should consider, 
although it is not required to do so. Stover, 140 Idaho at 931-32. As a result, "[a]ll other 
factors are, and must be, subservient to that end." Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500 
(emphasis added). Therefore, where the need to protect society does not demand 
incarceration, the sentencing court should avoid imposing it as a sentence. 
I.C. § 19-2521(1); Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
The district court explicitly found: "Considering protection of society first, I don't 
believe that Ms. Skogen would commit such an act again ... repeat of this action by her 
would be remote." (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.3-7.) It also found: "I don't think that it's a 
situation of specific deterrence to Ms. Skogen." (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls. 13-15.) These 
two determinations reveal that Ms. Skogen presents no threat to society. Additionally, 
the district court found that, in terms of rehabilitation, Ms. Skogen was in no more need 
of treatment through counseling than any other person affected by these events. 
(3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.8-12.) When there is no longer an ability of the penal system to 
reduce the risk (if any) that a defendant poses to society through rehabilitation, 
imprisonment is no longer appropriate. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489 
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(Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing that where age or rehabilitation have made the defendant's 
situation such that they no longer present a risk of recidivism, continued incarceration is 
inappropriate); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988) (same). This is 
particularly true when the person in question had a stable background and had been a 
law-abiding member of society for the majority of their adulthood.7 Cook, 145 Idaho at 
489. Therefore, as there was no specific need to rehabilitate Ms. Skogen, Cook and 
Eubank would instruct that continued incarceration is an inappropriate result because, 
as the district court explicitly found, Ms. Skogen did not present a risk for recidivism. 
(3/11/11 Tr., p. 261, Ls.3-7.) 
These findings in regard to the majority of the other sentencing objectives reveal 
that society has no reason to demand incarceration to protect itself from Ms. Skogen. 
Therefore, because incarceration is not required by the need to protect society, the 
paramount goal in sentencing, the decision to impose a sentence of incarceration 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. 
§ 19-2521(1). 
Furthermore, when looking at all the factors articulated by the Legislature and 
Judiciary, most indicate that a prison sentence is not appropriate in Ms. Skogen's 
case. Most tellingly, four of the six factors the Legislature lists as indicating a need 
for incarceration to protect society are not present in her case.8 See I.C. § 19-2521(1). 
7 As evidenced by the multitude of witness testimony, Ms. Skogen had a stable 
background. (See generally 3/11/11 Tr., pp.97-235.) She has no other discernible 
criminal history than this instance. (PSI, p.4.) 
8 As Ms. Skogen demonstrated, the premise behind using general deterrence as a 
sentencing factor is unreliable, and therefore, should not be weighed heavily, if at all. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in Section (0)(2). infra, her sentence does not even 
actually serve that objective because of the lack of certainty between it and sentences 
12 
Ms. Skogen does not pose an undue risk to commit another crime. (See 3/11/11 Tr., 
p.261, Ls.3-15.) She is not in need of correctional treatment. (See 3/11/11 Tr., 
p.261, Ls.8-12.) There is no need to deter her specifically by incarcerating her. 
3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.13-15.) And finally, Ms. Skogen is not a repeat offender. (PSI, 
p.4.) Thus, a sufficient consideration of all six of these factors reveals that society does 
not demand imprisonment to provide protection. 
In addition, four of the nine factors indicating that prison is inappropriate are also 
present in this case. See LC. § 19-2521 (2). Ms. Skogen did not contemplate that her 
actions would cause harm to C.J. (See, e.g., 3/11/11 Tr., p.258, Ls.16-19.) She has no 
prior history of delinquency. (PSI, p.4.) As the district court found at sentencing, she is 
unlikely to engage in such criminal conduct again. (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.3-7; see also 
3/11/11 Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.186, L.4 (Christopher Gay testifying that Ms. Skogen has 
been entrusted to watch his daughter on two subsequent occasions, empirically 
demonstrating that this factor favors no rncarceration).) And, based on her character, it 
is unlikely that she will commit another crime, particularly since she has no other 
criminal history. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.13-15; PSI, p.4.) A sufficient consideration 
of these factors only reinforces the conclusion that society does not demand protection 
through incarceration in this case. 
Based on a consideration of all the factors in light of the ultimate goal of 
protecting society, this case does not require imprisonment. As such, relying on only 
one factor to justify such an intense punishment and using it to trump the primary focus 
in similar cases. Therefore, the general deterrence factor also does not indicate that 
society demands protection through incarceration for those reasons, leaving only one of 
the aggravating factors present in any form in Ms. Skogen's case. 
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of sentencing, is improper. It constitutes a severe abuse of discretion, undermining the 
entire sentencing scheme established by the Legislature and Judiciary. A sufficient 
consideration of all the factors indicates that Ms. Skogen poses a negligible risk to 
society and that society does not demand protection through incarceration in this 
case. As such, the district court's decision to rely on general deterrence alone to 
incarcerate her represents an abuse of discretion. This Court should remedy that 
abuse. 
D. The Sentence Imposed By The District Court In This Case Fails To Promote 
Generali Deterrence, Andi As Such. The Sentence f ails To_e,romote_ ArllY Of The 
Recognized Sentencin91.--Objectlves Besides Punl,shment 
Even if this Court decides that general deterrence should still be considered as a 
sentencing objective, the sentence imposed in this case does not promote that 
objective, as it undermines the certainty necessary to generate any general deterrent 
effect. Ensuring that there is certainty (achieved through continuity) between sentences 
does not deprive the sentencing court of its discretion in that regard. 9 It merely 
recognizes that if the sentencing court wants to rely on general deterrence to justify a 
sentence. it will necessarily have to consider other similar sentences when it acts, lest it 
destroy whatever value that factor provides in terms of protection for society. 
1. The Challenge To The Misapplication Of This Factor In Ms. Skoqen's Case 
Specifically Was Preserve.d By Defense Counsel's A~guments In Regard To 
The Need To Be Consistent From Sentence To Sentence 
Defense counsel preserved this issue when it presented the district court with 
information regarding various similar sentences and requested that it consider them in 
14 
terms of its consideration of general deterrence.10 (Tr., p.253, L.20 - p.254, L.10.) 
Furthermore, at the time defense counsel began to go through that information, the 
State objected to its use at sentencing. (Tr., p.251, Ls.4-9.) And while the district court 
allowed defense counsel to continue to discuss that information, it stated: ~1 tend to 
agree with [the prosecutor] .... I'll let you continue. But sentences in prior cases is not 
going to be a big factor in any decision I make."11 (Tr., p.251, Ls.10-22.) Defense 
counsel responded: "I do want to touch on it. I think ... having a proportionality 
analysis, that it's important for me to do that. ... it's appropriate for the Court to 
consider and for a proportionalrty analysis, when considering punishment." (Tr., p.251, 
L.23 - p.252, L.2, p.252, Ls.22-24.) With these statements, defense counsel clearly 
9 For example, while maintaining continuity in terms of custodial status, the district court 
maintains discretion as to the length of the imposed sentence. 
10 Just because defense counsel recognized that general deterrence was a factor and 
made arguments in that regard does not mean that the factor is not flawed or that 
Ms. Skogen's other arguments in that regard were waived or that she invited any error 
in the district court's consideration thereof, as the State contends. (See Resp. Br., 
pp.5-6 n.2.) At the trial level, counsel had to operate within the established framework. 
At the appellate level, however, this Court can review the sentencing scheme and 
ensure it is still being applied properly. At the very least, by requesting that the district 
court impose a sentence properly "based on the factors outlined that the Court has to 
apply," (Tr., p.248, Ls.3-4), Ms. Skogen preserves any challenge to the subsequent 
improper consideration of those factors. 
11 The district court made its position in regard to that information clear as it imposed the 
sentence: "all cases are d rfferent. The sentences that may have been imposed in a 
different case that I'm not familiar with really don't mean a lot to me because the factual 
situations are always different." (Tr., p.257, Ls.7-11.) This refusal to consider these 
arguments and, particularly, the evidence supporting them, is also indicative of the 
district court's abuse of discretion in this case. "A trial court abuses its discretion if it 
unduly limits the information rt considers before ruling upon an I.C.R. 35 motion." 
State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824 (2008) (holding that, even though the evidence of 
the length of previously-imposed sentences in similar cases may not be directly on 
point, when it is relevant to the decision at hand, disregarding that evidence is an abuse 
of discretion). Here, the district court's disregard of such information prohibited it from 
being able to properly assess whether the sentence it was about to impose would 
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preserved all arguments relating to the need to consider these other cases, both in 
regard to general deterrence specifically, as well as the concept of punishment 
generally. 
2. The District Court's Failure To Impose A Sentence That Was Consistent With 
Other, Similar Cases Undermines Any General Deterrent Value This 
Sentence Might Have, As Well As Any General Deterrent Value The Other 
Similarly-Based Sentences Might Have 
There are several reasons why Ms. Skogen's sentence does not serve the 
general deterrence objective: the sentence is inconsistent with other similar sentences, 
depriving them all of the necessary consistency which forms the basis for any general 
deterrent effect they might have 12; and, as the act seeking to be deterred is one based 
on the emotions of the moment, it is nearly impossible to provide an effective general 
deterrent for such actions. 
First, it is necessary to provide consistency in sentencing in order for those 
sentences to have a general deterrent effect. Gary Kleck et al., The Missing Link in 
General Deterrence Research, Criminology, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2005, at 623, 647. General 
deterrence only works if the targets of that effect are able to predict the certainty, 
severity, and swiftness of the punishment. Id. Such predictions are only possible if 
there is certainty of arrest, the certainty of conviction, the certainty of imprisonment, 
certainty of duration of sentence, and certainty of swift punishment. Id. at 633-35. 
actually serve the objectives, particularly general deterrence, and thus demonstrates the 
abuse of its discretion. 
12 In addition, imposing such an inconsistent sentence impermissibly creates a special 
sentencing category for temporary care givers, such as babysitters, which is an 
independent abuse of discretion which violates the separation of powers between the 
branches of government. See State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646. 649 (Ct. App. 2006), 
reh'g denied, rev. denied; I.C. § 18-4006(1). 
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In the case of voluntary manslaughter, the statute establishes the certainty of 
duration of sentence by providing that a sentence shall not exceed fifteen years and a 
fifteen thousand dollar fine. I. C. § 18-4007. Within that range, the district court 
maintains its discretion to impose the appropriate sentence duration. Consistency in 
regard to the likely custodial status d9es not deprive the district court of its discretion in 
either of those respects (up to a fifteen-year sentence and fifteen thousand dollar fine). 
Therefore, the State's concern - that adopting Ms. Skogen's perspective will deprive 
courts of their discretion and instead lead to rigid exactness in sentencing - is 
unfounded. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-13.) As ever, the district court will have discretion in 
determining the severity of the sentence. Consistency does not undermine discretion. 
However, if the district court wishes to impose a sentence for general deterrent 
purposes, it needs to ensure the other certainties, particularly certainty of imprisonment 
(or in this situation, as established in other cases, the certainty of non-imprisonment), 
remain intact. See Kleck et al.. at 633-35, 647. As defense counsel noted, the public is 
only often aware of just the charge and the sentence imposed.13 (Tr., p.253, 
L.22 - p.254, L.9.) Furthermore, in a state such as Idaho, where the pool of data for 
such comparisons is small, the detractive effect of outlier sentences on the concept of 
general deterrence is magnified to the point where the concept of deterrence becomes 
implausible and the deterrent effect miniscule. See Kleck et al., at 633. Therefore, 
when this district court imposed a sentence of imprisonment when numerous other 
district courts were imposing suspended sentences for similar (and at times, more 
13 This contention is confirmed by the data analysis explained by Gary Kleck and his 
co-authors. See Kleck et al., at 630. 
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egregious) acts, 14 the district court in this case deprived the potential targets of the 
general deterrent effect of the certainty regarding potential imprisonment. 
When the public, the target of the general deterrent effect, looks at these other 
sentences, its conclusion would be that probation is the likely result in such cases. Yet 
the district court in this case imposed a significant prison sentence without any 
opportunity for probation (or even a period of retained jurisdiction, wherein the 
defendant may be able to demonstrate amenability to a probationary setting). Now, the 
public lookjng at these cases cannot be sure whether or not the result will be a prison 
sentence. Therefore, members of the public are unlikely to be able to effectively gauge 
the likely penalties for their potential actions and weigh them against the perceived 
benefit of their potential actions to determine whether they beHeve the actions are 
worthwhile. As such, this sentence is deprived of any general deterrent effect, as are all 
the other similar sentences.15 
Furthennore, in the face of these other sentences, this sentence creates 
uncertainty within the law itself because it essentially establishes a de facto category of 
14 The packet of cases provided by defense counsel details the decisions in many of 
those other cases, but a few are worth special consideration. First, Ms. Tiffany 
attempted to suffocate her child to quiet its cries, was unsuccessful, and then made a 
second attempt, which succeeded in quieting the child by killing it. State v. Tiffany, 139 
Idaho 909, 911 (2004). She received a suspended sentence for her deliberate 
actions. Tiffany, CR-00-7677 (Judgment and Sentencing Disposition). Second, 
Ms. Nakaji killed her child in the heat of passion. Nakaji, CR-02-16548 (Amended 
Information). For her conviction of voluntary manslaughter, she received a suspended 
sentence. Nakaji, CR-02-16548 (Order Suspending Execution of Judgment and 
Sentence and Notice of Right to Appeal). Finally, Ms. Whittle severely abused an 
autistic child for whom Ms. Whittle had been appointed legal guardian, and her 
negligent "care" ultimately led to the child's death. State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 49, 50 
(Ct. App. 2007). Ms. Whittle was sentenced to probation for her culpability in the child's 
death. Id. 
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manslaughter which applies only to babysitters or others in positions of trust with regard 
to children . (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.259 Ls.19-22 ("There's certainly an aggravating factor 
here in that, Ms. Skogen, you were a baby-sitter of young [C.J.]. You were in a position 
of trust, and you abused that trust.").) Yet other persons placed in a position of trust 
(i.e., legal guardians) may still get probation for far more abhorrent actions toward their 
charges.16 See, e.g., Whittle, 145 Idaho at 50. This further undermines any continuity 
in regard to such sentences, which reduces any general deterrent impact they may 
have. As such, this creation of a de facto category of manslaughter for babysitters 
further evidences how this sentence fails to serve the objective of general deterrence. 
Moreover, the argument in favor of general deterrence presumes that the person 
about to act is able to weigh the potential punishment against her action and determine 
whether she still believes the action to be worthwhile. That premise is nonexistent in a 
case of voluntary manslaughter, which is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human 
15 For a noninclusive list of cases now deprived of general deterrent effect, see the 
packet of cases submitted by defense counsel. 
16 The fact that Ms. Whittle subsequently violated the tenns of her probation is irrelevant 
to the point that. for her actions in regard to the death of her young charge, her 
sentence was suspended. While it is true that the Court of Appeals was not reviewing 
the propriety of such a sentence as her appeal was only timely from the revocation of 
probation, it did assert that "Under these circumstances, the sentence for felony injury to 
a child is not unduly harsh." Whittle, 145 Idaho at 52. Regardless, the fact that she 
received the sentence she did is the critical point - a legal guardian who abused her 
charge and neglected her obligations to keep the child safe from perilous situations was 
sentenced to probation. See Whittle, 145 Idaho at 50-51 . Furthermore, the fact that her 
underlying sentence was longer than Ms. Skogen's only serves to demonstrate that 
even if the district court should ensure like custodial statuses in order to promote 
general deterrence, it still maintains its discretion as to the length of the underlying 
sentence. As such, this point undermines the State's prior argument, that accepting 
Ms. Skogen's perspectives in regard to the continued use of general deterrence as a 
sentencing factor will deprive the district courts of their discretion at sentencing. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) 
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being .. . upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion." I.C. § 18-4006(1) (emphasis 
added). By its very definition, a person about to engage in an act of voluntary 
manslaughter is not in a rational state of mind; rather, they are experiencing extreme 
emotion, reacting to a sudden quarrel or inflammatory event. See id. They are not 
acting with intent or malice. See id. And in that moment, they are not able to engage in 
the necessary weighing of costs and benefits necessary to create the general deterrent 
effect. See Kleck, et al., at 633-35. Therefore, in cases of voluntary manslaughter, 
general deterrence is an immaterial and ineffective concept. As such, a sentence of 
imprisonment in such a case cannot be based on that premise alone. 
Therefore, even if the principle of general deterrence remains so revered that it 
can trump the district court's findings on the other sentencing objectives, particularly 
protection of society, and allow for imprisonment when the other factors indicate that 
imprisonment is inappropriate, this sentence does not serve that principle. As such, 
there is no justification to impose a sentence of imprisonment based on that premise. In 
fact, the statute in which the Legislature addressed such a consideration would suggest 
that based on the district court's findings, the presumption for probation has not been 
overcome. Therefore, under both the statutory and precedential formulations of the 
sentencing scheme, Ms. Skogen's sentence is revealed to be an abuse of the district 
court's discretion. This Court should remedy that abuse. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An 
Excessive Sentence On Ms. Skogen 
A. Introduction 
In addition to its abuses of discretion in regard to its consideration of the 
sentencing objectives, the district court also abused its discretion by failing to sufficiently 
consider the mitigating factors in this case, or by erroneously finding aggravating 
factors. Only one such issue was addressed by the State in its Respondent's Brief: 
that the district court erroneously found an aggravating factor in the fact that C.J.'s 
parents were initially under suspicion for child abuse. 
In regard to the arguments which it did contest, the State misconstrued 
Ms. Skogen's arguments by not considering the explanation of the factors. For 
example, it did not respond to Ms. Skogen's arguments that Dr. Hayes's explanations 
for her initial behavior needed to be considered alongside the fact that she was initially 
untruthful. Rather, the State merely contended that untruthfulness is an aggravating 
factor. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) Similarly, it asserted that Ms. Skogen somehow 
disputed the fact that her actions led to the conclusion of potential child abuse when she 
contended that the district court was improperly considering the fact that the officer 
conducted a thorough investigation in aggravation against her, despite the fact that, 
even in that initial investigation, she provided evidence in the parents' favor. (See 
Resp. Br., p.15 n.5.) The State's arguments in this regard are overly narrow and miss 
the point of Ms. Skogen's contentions - in order to conduct a sufficient examination of 
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these factors, the district court needed to consider the entire factor, including the 
explanations in the record. Failing to do so constitutes an abuse of its discretion. 
B. Because The District Court Did Not Sufficiently Consider The Numerous 
Mitigating Factors Present In This Case, It Imposed An Excessive Sentence ln 
An Abuse Of Its Discretion 
The State did not contest Ms. Skogen's demonstrations of the district court's 
failure t_o sufficiently consider the following factors: her lack of any prior record; her 
character as a trustworthy care provider for children both before and since the events of 
this case, as attested to by various witnesses; her lack of a need for rehabilitation or 
need for specific deterrence, as she is unlikely to commit such a crime again; and her 
substantial support network.17 (See generally Resp. Br. (the only response to the 
mitigating factor arguments may be found on pages 14-15); compare App. Br., pp.30-34 
(the explanations of these factors need not be reiterated here, but they are incorporated 
herein by reference thereto}.} It also did not respond to her assertion that a sufficient 
consideration of these factors reveals a more lenient sentence was appropriate and, 
more importantly, that a period of probation would satisfactorily address all the 
sentencing objectives in this case. 
As to the only of these arguments against which the State did provide a 
response, the State contends that the district court is not required to accept her 
explanation of the events in regard to her psychological state of mind during the initial 
hours of the investigation. (Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) That mischaracterizes Ms. Skogen's 
17 In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Skogen referred to an offer of support from Uher step-
father (a police officer of over thirty years}." (App. Br. , p.31.) She would ltke to be clear 
that the person to whom she referred is her father-in-law, not her step-father, and 
apologizes for the error. 
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argument, which was that the mere finding of the aggravating factor's existence in that 
regard was erroneous in light of the entire record. (See App. Br., pp.21-25.) The 
consideration of this factor is erroneous because, as Dr. Hayes explained, that reaction 
was natural, given the events that unfolded. (See App. Br., pp.21-25.) The State 
presented no contradictory evidence on that point, either before the district court or now. 
Additionally, the dishonesty that the district court found so abhorrent only lasted for a 
short duration (less than one day), before Ms. Skogen provided officers with a complete 
accounting, which has not materially changed since. (See App. Br., p.25.) 
And while the State may be correct that the district court may consider the initial 
dishonesty in aggravation, it failed to sufficiently consider Dr. Hayes's accompanying 
explanation of the actions, which means that the district court insufficiently considered 
Ms. Skogen's mental condition when it imposed sentence. That is an abuse of 
discretion, since as the Idaho Supreme Court recognized, the sentencing court must 
consider a defendant's mental condition if it was a significant factor. See, e.g., Hollon 
v. State, 132 Ida ho 5 73, 581 ( 1999). Since the district court made her untruthfulness a 
significant factor, it also needed to sufficiently consider her mental condition regarding 
that behavior in order to sufficiently consider the behavior itself.18 As such, the district 
court abused its discretion by not sufficiently considering Dr. Hayes's evidence, 
whether or not it was free to disregard Ms. Skogen's explanation of the events. It still 
needed to consider the reasons for her behavior in order to sufficiently consider her 
18 Ms. Skogen's consultation wrth Dr. Hayes was aimed at evaluating her psychological, 
emotional and interpersonal functioning in regard to the events of this case. Dr. Hayes 
diagnosed her with General Anxiety Disorder and elements of other, related disorders. 
(Hayes Report, pp.1, 6.) 
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initial dishonesty as a sentencing factor. A sufficient consideration of the entire factor 
reveals that a more lenient sentence would be appropriate. (See App. Br., pp.21-27.) 
The State also contends that Ms. Skogen's assertion that she was able to 
reconcile the events of that night within one day, and thus provide an accurate 
accounting of her actions, is somehow contradicted by the fact that the reconciliation 
occurred in response to officers confronting her with the failed polygraph results. 
(Resp. Br., p.14.) The State, however, appears to confuse "contradiction" with 
"explanation." Just because Ms. Skogen's reconciliation was triggered by the officer's 
confrontation of her story with the polygraph results does not undermine the 
reconciliation itself. Rather, it explains how Ms. Skogen was able to achieve the 
reconciliation and, thus, be forthright with officers within so short a time. (Compare 
3/11/11 Tr., p.207, Ls.5-14 (wherein Dr. Hayes explained that such reconciliations can 
take years to occur and described a situation where it took the person some thirty years 
to achieve such a reconciliation).) 
Additionally, the State criticized Ms. Skogen's argument in regard to the district 
court's consideration of the scrutiny placed on C.J.'s parents during the initial hours of 
the investigation. It decries her contention, saying: "[Ms.] Skogen cannot seriously 
dispute that her statements that C.J. just went limp were among the reasons C.J.'s 
parents were investigated ... .'' (Resp. Br., p.15 n.5:) Ms. Skogen does not, in fact, 
contest that C.J.'s injuries that night were part of the reason Dr. Celebreti initially 
suspected child abuse. (App. Br., p.26 (recognizing that the conclusion was a result of 
the consideration of various other already-healing injuries "in addition to the cranial 
injuries.").) However, the State conveniently omits to consider the other, already-
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healing injuries in its attempt to demonize Ms. Skogen . (Resp. Br., p.15 n.5.) The fact 
that there were other injuries would naturally lead to the conclusion that someone may 
have been abusing the child on a long-term basis. The officer investigated the most 
likely suspects. as was his duty. The district court's consideration of this fact as only 
attributable to Ms. Skogen does a significant disservice to the officer, who would not 
have been doing his job properly if he had failed to initially consider all the possible 
explanations. Ms. Skogen's statements on their behalf should have been weighed as 
well, along with the fact that within twenty-four hours, she absolved them of the 
investigative scrutiny with her confession. If th~ district court is going to consider a 
factor, that consideration needs to be sufficiently thorough. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho 
at 489-90; State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). A sufficient consideration 
means a consideration of all aspects of that factor, not just those the State believes 
noteworthy. By not sufficiently considering this factor, the district court's use of it in 
aggregation (particularly when most of the other factors in this case were mitigating) 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
The district court failed to engage in a sufficient consideration of all the mitigating 
factors in this case. That insufficient consideration of the factors constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and caused the district court to impose an excessive sentence. See id. This 
Court should remedy that abuse. 
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CONCLUSION 
If this Court finds that the district court erred in tem,s of its reliance on general 
deterrence alone or by not considering the information defense counsel submitted 
regarding the other similar cases from Kootenai County, Ms. Skogen requests that her 
case be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the district court abused its discretion and 
imposed an excessive sentence, Ms. Skogen respectfully requests that this Court 
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 15th day of May, 2012. 
/,L :___ /(?/~ 
BRIAN R DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Pu~lic Defender 
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